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To The reader
This Policy Series by James Salzman brings attention to a rapidly
developing phenomenon—payments for ecosystem services (PES).
Salzman, the Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law and the Nicholas Institute Professor of Environmental Policy at Duke University,
explains when and where ecosystem services can be provided by
voluntary markets rather than government actions.
The key to understanding how PES work is rooted in the basis
of any voluntary market transaction—gains from trade. One party
agrees to take action because another party offers an incentive.
Both parties benefit. A beekeeper, for example, brings her hives to
an orchard to provide pollination services for a fee. But Salzman
explores the less obvious services such as forests at the top of
a municipal watershed that act as a filter providing clean water to
people below.
Salzman states that we receive many environmental benefits for
“free,” which provides little or no incentive for people to pay for them
or for entrepreneurs to provide them. Because price signals that alert
individuals about scarce resources in traditional markets are absent,
ecosystem services are taken for granted—until they stop providing
benefits. Then the cost of remediation or building infrastructure, such
as a water treatment plant, makes their value obvious.
For decades the solution to environmental protection has been
government action. Today, knowledge about environmental processes combined with increased environmental sensitivity provides
opportunities for entrepreneurs to find innovative ways of developing
markets for ecosystem services.
This publication is part of the PERC Policy Series of papers on
timely environmental topics. This issue was edited by Roger Meiners
and Laura Huggins and was designed by Mandy-Scott Bachelier. We
are grateful to the M.J. Murdock Charitable Trust for their support
of this project.

Desig ni ng Pay m e n t s f or
ec os y s t e m serv ices

WHAT ARE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES?
When visiting a store, one expects to find useful goods and
services such as apples to eat and the refrigerators that keep them
chilled. We depend on similar goods and services in our everyday
lives. Indeed, we take them for granted. Nature also provides us
valuable goods and services, and we take many of those for granted
as well. When we bite into a juicy apple, if we pause to think beyond
the store where it was purchased, we may think of soil and water,
but probably not the natural pollinators that fertilized the apple blossom so the fruit can set. When we drink a cool glass of tap water,
we may think of the local reservoir, but not the source of the water
quality, which lies miles upstream in the wooded watershed that
filters and cleans the water as it flows downhill.
Largely taken for granted, healthy ecosystems provide a variety
of critical goods and services. Created by the interactions of living
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services
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organisms with their environment, “ecosystem services” supply
both the conditions and processes that sustain human life. Trees
provide timber; coastal marshes provide shellfish. That’s obvious.
The services underpinning these goods, though less visible, are
equally important. If you doubt this, consider how to grow an apple
without pollination, pest control, or soil fertility.
A specific landscape offers a range of ecosystem services. A
forest at the top of a watershed, for example, provides water quality
by filtering contaminants from the water as it flows through roots
and soil, flood control as the water slows while moving through the
watershed, pollination by those pollinators living along the edge of
the forest, and biodiversity conservation if endangered plants or
animals live in the woods. Or consider something as simple as soil.
More than a clump of dirt, soil is a complex matrix of organic and
inorganic constituents transformed by numerous tiny organisms.
The level of biological activity within soil is staggering. Under a
square meter of pasture soil in Denmark, for example, scientists
identified more than 50,000 worms, 48,000 small insects, and
10 million nematodes. This living soil provides a range of critical
ecosystem services: buffering and moderation of the hydrological
cycle, physical support for plants, retention and delivery of nutrients
to plants, disposal of wastes and dead organic matter, and renewal
of soil fertility (Daily 1997).
While one can categorize ecosystem services any number
of ways, the most common approach is that employed by the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). It divided services
into four categories:
1.		 provisioning services (the products obtained from
ecosystems—food, fiber, fresh water);
2.		 regulating services (the benefits obtained from the
regulation of ecosystem processes—pest control, water
purification, erosion control, carbon sequestration);
2
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3.		 cultural services (the nonmaterial benefits that people obtain
from ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, cognitive
development, recreation, and aesthetic experiences);
4.		 supporting services needed to maintain other services (soil
formation, photosynthesis).
Ecosystem services are provided and enjoyed across a range
of scales. Pollination and renewal of soil fertility are local services.
Climate stabilization and genetic resources are generated locally
(through carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation) but
enjoyed globally. Thus, depending on the service, a wide range of
landscapes can be important service providers, from pristine, intact
ecosystems such as natural forests, wetlands, and estuaries, to
human-dominated landscapes such as agricultural lands.
Just as we tend not to think about everyday goods and services
until the store is out of apples or the refrigerator stops working, so
too, do we generally fail to appreciate the importance of ecosystem services until we suffer the impacts of their loss. One cannot
easily appreciate the impact that widespread wetland destruction
has had on the ecosystem service of water retention until after a
flood. Nor does one fully appreciate water quality until recognizing how development in forested watersheds has degraded the
service of water purification. The costs from degradation of these
services are high and are suffered in rich and poor countries alike
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). In short, ecosystem services are
critical to our well-being.

Economic Value of Ecosystem Services
Awareness of ecosystem services’ importance is not new. Plato
wrote about the service of soil retention more than 2,500 years ago
(Daily 1997). But efforts to identify and calculate these services’
valuable contributions are surprisingly recent. Research demonstrates the high costs of replacing such services if they fail. ConDesigning Payments For Ecosystem Services
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sider a specific service, such as soil providing nitrogen to plants.
Nitrogen is naturally supplied to plants through both nitrogen fixing
organisms and the recycling of nutrients in the soil. If nitrogen were
provided by commercial fertilizers rather than natural processes,
the lowest cost estimate for crops in the United States would be
$45 billion, and the figure for all land plants would be $320 billion
(Daily 1997). Such estimates are inherently uncertain, of course,
but the extraordinary costs required to substitute for such services
by artificial means are clear.
While the estimated dollar value of these services is impressive, these estimates have significant limitations. First, because
most ecosystem services are not exchanged in robust markets
(such as buying apples), there are no obvious prices to calculate
their values. Economists have different ways to measure their
economic value, all of which require extrapolation or assumptions.
For example, a wetland ecosystem may be characterized either
through its features (site-specific characteristics such as landscape
context, vegetation type, salinity), goods (vegetation, mollusks,
fish), services (nutrient cycling, water retention), or amenities
(recreation, bird-watching).
These goods, services, and amenities can be divided into separate categories. The most obvious includes consumable goods such
as cranberries and crabs that are exchanged in markets and easily
priced (direct market uses). Activities such as hiking and fishing
(direct nonmarket uses) as well as more intangible existence and
option values (nonmarket, nonuse) are generally not exchanged
in markets. As a result, their values must be determined indirectly.
Many ecosystem services are categorized as indirect nonmarket
uses, for while they provide clear benefits to humans, they are
neither directly “consumed” nor exchanged in markets (Barbier,
Acreman, and Knowler 1997).
The second challenge is that an ecosystem service’s value is
landscape-specific. The benefit to humans is not a straightforward
4
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biophysical measure, identical ecosystems in different locations
will have very different values. The value of a wetland’s nutrient
trapping service, for instance, depends on the location of its outflow. Does it flow to shellfish beds (high value) or to a fast-flowing
ocean current (low value)?
Third, policy makers must concern themselves with two different types of valuation. The first is the absolute value of the
ecosystem service. Methods to determine this have been noted
above. These values may prove important for political or advocacy
purposes. Knowing that wetlands provide billions of dollars of
services to local communities may make it easier to adopt regulations or other protective measures for wetlands. The second type
of measure is marginal value. The fact that pollinators annually
provide Americans up to $1.6 billion of service or that soil fertility
is worth $45 billion is important to know for general policy direction, but it does not help to inform specific land use or pollution
permitting decisions. One cannot divide the $45 billion value of
soil fertility by the nation’s total agricultural acreage to determine
the value of the services on five acres of land threatened by a
specific development. Land use decisions are made on the margins, for example, whether to allow development of 10 hectares
in a 70-hectare wetland. Thus, the greatest need for ecosystem
service valuation may be at the margins, determining how much
service provision is worth in this particular location.
Fourth, often times we do not need to know the absolute
value of a service, so long as it is obviously important. In deciding
whether or not to invest in an ecosystem service or a technological
service provider, the key question is relative cost. If it costs $10
million to build a treatment plant and $5 million to institute landuse changes with the same resulting improvement in water quality,
then investing in an ecosystem service makes financial sense.
That is, valuing the costs of substitutes may be more important
than valuing the absolute service.
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services

5

In sum, ecosystem services make critically important contributions to human welfare and valuation can make this clear. Marginal
valuation will generally provide the most useful guide to decisions
as such services are brought into markets.

Why Are Ecosystem Services Underprotected?
Despite their central role in provision of important benefits,
ecosystem services are rarely protected by the law (Salzman
1997). Nor, in the past, have significant markets arisen that
capitalize the commercial value of these services. The reason
for this relative neglect is threefold: ignorance, institutions, and
immature markets.

Ignorance
Perhaps the most basic reason we do not pay more attention to
the provision of ecosystem services is that we take them for granted.
We are often ignorant of the sources of goods and services we
depend on. To efficiently provide services, at a minimum we must
be able to identify services on a local ecological scale—detailing
how they are generated and how they are delivered. We can make
empirically sound predictions that actions on a gross scale, such
as clear-cutting, will affect nutrient flows and services or that a significant loss of animal and plant populations will reduce ecosystem
resiliency. In the aggregate, improved knowledge provides better
guidance in warning against destructive practices. But landscape
context matters. In most cases, our scientific knowledge is still inadequate to undertake meaningful marginal analysis. For example,
it is difficult to predict how developing 30 percent of this wetland will
impact water quality, flooding events, or local bird populations.

Institutions
A second obstacle to the protection of services is institutional.
Political jurisdictions are rarely aligned with ecologically significant
6
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areas such as watersheds; instead, they exercise authority over areas defined by state, provincial, or municipal borders. Environmental problems do not track political boundaries, and it is difficult for
multiple political actors to agree on a constructive course of action.
Even more challenging, the costs and benefits of conserving ecosystem services may be separated across jurisdictions. Thus, for
example, upstream and downstream jurisdictions will have very different views about the value of upstream forest conservation when
it comes to water quality. As a result, consistent efforts to manage
landscapes to ensure service provision are easily confounded by
political action problems. Additionally, while private property in the
United States and some other nations tends to have strong protection against invasion, this is not true in much of the world, where
the ability of a land possessor to protect property is weak.

Immature Markets
While some ecosystem services are clearly valuable to the
general welfare, they may have little or even no current market
value. We have no shortage of markets for many ecosystem goods
(such as apples or fish). People pay money for apples every day at
the grocery store without a second’s thought. But the ecosystem
services underpinning these goods are often treated as if they are
free. This does not mean that they have no value. Rather, services
may have no market value for the simple reason that no markets
exist in which they can be bought or sold. As a result, there are no
direct price mechanisms to signal the scarcity or degradation until
they fail, at which point their nonmarket value becomes obvious because of the costs to restore or replace them (Heal et al. 2001).
Many ecosystem services are often described as “public goods.”
This is a term economists use to describe a good that is nonrival
(consumption of the good by one does not reduce the amount left
for others) and non-excludable (individuals cannot be excluded
from consuming the good). Unlike an apple that can be bought
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services
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and consumed by one person, all those who live in a country with
secure borders and low crime rates benefit from these public goods,
whether they pay taxes or not. Similarly, those who live downstream
from wetlands benefit from the role wetlands play in slowing floodwaters, whether they paid to conserve the wetlands or not.
In fact, many ecosystem services, ranging from flood control
to climate stability, provide nonrival and non-excludable benefits.
Because these services have no market price, they appear to be
free and, as a result, are taken for granted (until their importance
is recognized after their loss).
Take the example of wetlands and their role as a nursery for
young fish. The wetland’s owner provides a benefit to anglers and
those who like to eat fish by providing habitat for fish to grow and
reach maturity. But these benefits are uncompensated. The market value of the wetlands depends on its location, the pressure for
coastal development, and the scarcity of alternative development
sites. The benefits it provides simply are not part of the current
calculation. If the wetland is developed, the nursery benefits will
be lost. There are no market signals to suggest they should be
considered in the transaction. Because we can easily value ecosystem goods such as timber or fish, we tend to invest in extracting
these goods even if it means degrading certain services related
to their production.
These are not isolated examples. Because landowners generally are not paid for the services their land provides to others, it
should come as no surprise that they see few incentives to conserve
or enhance the uncompensated services they generate, nor are
there obvious reasons why they should take service provision into
account when making land-use decisions. The landowners’ focus
will be on the current maximum net value of the alternative uses
of the land (Farrier 1995).
Ignorance and public goods—barriers to market creation—
are related. Markets create knowledge. We have advanced un8
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derstanding of how to manage farmland to maximize production
of cash crops for the simple reason that they are cash crops. It
pays to manage land efficiently for crop production. We have a
much poorer understanding of how to manage land for ecosystem
service provision, not because these services have no value but
because landowners cannot capture the value of the services their
landscape provides. Agricultural markets provide clear signals to
farmers of the value of clearing wetlands to grow more crops; but
there are few markets for biodiversity, water quality, or flood control
to reflect the loss in benefits once the land is cleared.

Why Choose Payments?
Consider the example of water quality. Imagine that a municipal
water supplier owns the upland forest, which naturally filters and
cleans water as it flows through the upper watershed. Property owners in the farmlands are dairy farmers, grazing cows on their fields
beside the stream that flows into the reservoir. The farmers could
manage their land to provide an improved service of water purification
by planting riparian vegetation buffers (e.g., erecting fences to protect
plants alongside the stream from grazing). Such vegetative buffers
capture nutrients and provide the ecosystem service of reducing silt
before it reaches the watercourse. Downstream water consumers
benefit from these actions, which provide clean drinking water that
does not require extensive pre-treatment. Farmers might benefit
from reduced stream bank erosion (see Box 1, page 10).
Traditionally, few landowners would plant riparian buffers.
Farmers may have been informed of the benefits of this practice
for themselves and for downstream users, but it is unlikely that
they would change their behavior due to the time and cost of fencing and the concerns over the loss of productivity from setting
aside pasture. Those who fenced off their streams would bear
all the costs, with no contributions from those downstream who
benefit from the cleaner water.
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services
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Box 1: A Model Watershed
Upl and Forest

Farmlands

r e s e r vo i r

Credit: © Sarah B. Lauterbach, reprinted with permission from River Network, www.rivernetwork.org.

So how could the downstream users ensure clean drinking
water? One might rely on engineering and build a pretreatment plant. An ecosystem service approach of riparian buffers,
however, may be less expensive. The traditional governmental
approach would likely impose prescriptive regulations to require
farmers to plant riparian buffers. One could equally rely on financial penalties, levying a tax on farmers who do not have buffers,
or trying to persuade farmers to put in buffers. These are set out
in Box 2, page 11.
One could, however, view the issue from a different perspective.
Why not simply recognize this situation for what it is—the provision
of valuable services to consumers—and realize this through an
10
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Box 2: Environmental Policy Toolkit in a Watershed
Prescription

Institute regulations requiring riparian buffers

Property rights

Combine regulations with tradable right of buffers

Penalty

Tax farmers who do not have buffers

Persuasion

Demonstrate the benefits of buffers with pilot projects

Payment

Pay for planting of buffers

explicit arrangement of payments for services rendered? Why not
treat farmers’ provision of ecosystem services as no different from
their provision of other marketable goods? Farmers are accustomed
to contractual arrangements for their agricultural products. Dairy
farmers sign contracts to sell their milk; potato farmers do the same.
Water filtration services may also be treated as a business transaction, where farmers manage their land through riparian buffers and
grass swales to “grow the crop of water quality” much the same as
dairy and potato farmers do for their cash crops.
In many respects, the provision of ecosystem services would
be no different than supplying traditional farm produce, with the
level of compensation dependent on the quality and level of serDesigning Payments For Ecosystem Services

11

vices provided. Such exchanges would be arm’s-length payments
for services rendered, creating an incentive for the landholder to
manage the property so that service provision is ensured. The
concept behind payments for ecosystem services (PES) is simple
and is set out in Box 3, below. Through this perspective, environmental protection can more closely resemble contracts between
service providers and service beneficiaries than the object of
governmental regulations.

Box 3: The PES Concept
The environment provides critically important services. Some of these are
captured by markets, but many are not. They are environmental benefits that
may currently be received for nothing and so regarded as “free.” As a result,
many ecosystem services tend to be both underconserved and undervalued. If
beneficiaries had to pay for explicit service provision, however, property owners
would think differently about sustainable land management practices. Payments
for ecosystem services seek to “get the incentives right” by capturing the benefits as well as by providing accurate signals to service providers and users that
reflect the value that ecosystem services deliver.1

12
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The first insight of an ecosystem services perspective is that
investing in natural capital can prove more efficient than using built
capital to deliver key services. As an example, consider the case
of flood control. One can address floodwaters through built capital,
such as engineered works (e.g., construction and maintenance of
dikes and levees) or through natural capital, such as landscape
management (e.g., restoration of wetlands in flood plains). In some
instances, landscape management may prove a better public and
private investment strategy for providing flood control once one
accounts for the many benefits of improved water quality, wildlife
habitat, and recreational amenities (see Box 4, page 14).
Payments for ecosystem services refer to voluntary transactions where a service provider is paid by or on behalf of service
beneficiaries for land, coastal, or marine management practices
that are expected to result in continued or improved service provision. The payment may be monetary or barter and is intended to
defray or compensate the costs of service provision. PES can include many different types of parties—from farmers, communities,
and taxpayers to consumers and corporations. PES schemes can
occur over very different scales—from pollination of local farms to
“shade-grown” coffee beans that are sold half a world from where
they are grown. PES also spans a wide range of transaction types,
from one-off payments for a biodiversity offset to arm’s-length
market transactions for carbon credits.
Consider how a PES can emerge. There is no doubt that landowners know their property better than the service beneficiaries
do. Landholders know the opportunity cost of a specific land-use
change and can determine the price they are willing to accept to
implement a change. For its part, the beneficiary knows how much
it is willing to pay and, in some cases (particularly when the government is the purchaser) which types of land-use changes would
be most valuable for service provision. The PES design challenge
is how most efficiently to transfer both types of information—(1)
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services
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Box 4: New York City Investing in Natural Capital
In the early 1990s, a combination of federal regulation and cost realities
drove New York City to reconsider its water supply strategy. New York City’s
water system provides about 1.2 billion gallons of drinking water to almost nine
million New Yorkers every day. Ninety percent of the water is drawn from the
Catskill/Delaware watershed, which extends 125 miles north and west of the city.
Under amendments to the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, municipal and other
water suppliers were required to filter their surface water supplies unless they
could demonstrate that they had taken other steps, including watershed protection measures, to protect their customers from harmful water contamination.
Presented with a choice between provision of clean water through building
a filtration plant or managing the watershed, New York City managers concluded
that an ecosystem services approach was more cost effective. It was estimated
that a filtration plant would cost between $6 and $8 billion to build. By contrast,
watershed protection efforts, which would include not only the acquisition of
critical watershed lands but also a variety of other programs designed to reduce
contamination sources in the watershed, would cost only about $1.5 billion.
Through a stakeholder consultation process, after two years and more than 150
meetings, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by 60 towns, 10 villages,
seven counties, and various environmental groups. Acting on behalf of the
beneficiaries of the Catskills’ water purification services, New York City chose to
invest in natural rather than built capital.
Source: Daily and Ellison (2002).
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willingness to pay/accept, and (2) service provision resulting from
a land use change—from one party to another in a mutually reinforcing fashion.
Prescriptive measures are inefficient at information exchange
for the simple reason that they are primarily a one-way discussion—the government telling regulated parties what they can or
cannot do. The farmer’s knowledge of which land-use changes
are least costly is ignored. Financial penalties suffer the same
shortcoming. It falls entirely on the government to determine not
only which actions to encourage or discourage, but also how much
financial penalty is needed to induce the appropriate behavior.
At their core, markets are an exchange of information about
willingness to pay and willingness to accept. The market mechanism
necessitates that each side reveal information to the other. Indeed, if
set up carefully, payment schemes can shift the information burden
to the landowners.
While the principle of PES is simply stated—those who benefit
from service provision should pay the providers—this is far easier
said than done, for the equally simple reason that ecosystem
services are taken for granted. Because it is difficult to prevent
someone who did not pay for an ecosystem service from benefiting
from it, it is equally difficult to get people to volunteer now to pay
for provision of these services. Why pay for something when you
have always gotten it for free? As a result, a key challenge in a PES
lies in creating a market that may not now exist—in capturing the
value of the service by compensating the providers for the services
they provide. This approach views environmental protection much
as a business transaction between willing parties.
When successful, PES creates positive economic incentives
for landowners to conserve or improve the function of their lands
for a variety of ecosystem services. In the process, PES may bring
new resources and new incentives to conservation, a particularly
important development when funding for conservation is scarce.
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services
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Types of Services Receiving Payments
As noted before, there is a broad range of ecosystem services.
Not all of these, however, are amenable to PES. If one looks at
the PES schemes operating or in pilot phases, payments cluster
around four broad types of services.
The first is watershed protection. This includes the ecosystem
services of water purification, ensuring water quantity, flood control,
erosion control, and others. In general, downstream beneficiaries
pay upstream landowners either for adopting particular land uses
or maintaining current land uses. Payments for water services
benefit from the advantage that it is relatively easy to identify both
the providers and the users of these services and, equally important, the users are generally discrete (e.g., private operations such
as hydroelectric facilities and industrial users) or institutions that
represent groups of users such as municipal water authorities (who
act on behalf of the public) or irrigation districts (who act on behalf
of the irrigation farmers). All of these parties have an obvious and
direct interest in service provision. Moreover, the beneficiaries, particularly water users, are accustomed to paying for water already.
Indeed, water services are the most common PES (Landell-Mills
and Porras 2002).
The second type of service is carbon sequestration. Depending on how the climate negotiations conclude, the sequestration
of carbon by reforestation and land use may come to dominate
other PES schemes in total value. The classic example of such
a PES scheme is a large emitter of carbon dioxide in a country
that regulates greenhouse gas emissions paying a landowner to
plant additional trees. In exchange for the additional carbon now
sequestered, the company obtains credits it can use to offset its
greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast to watershed services, carbon sequestration can operate at the regional, national, or global
scale, though the trend seems to be increasingly toward national
and global markets.
16
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The third service receiving payments is biodiversity conservation. Because biodiversity is a classic public good, the PES here
are smaller and more discrete. While there are isolated examples
of species habitat banks, biodiversity payments can take a wide
range of forms, including purchase of conservation easements,
payment for bioprospecting rights or research permits, hunting and
fishing licenses, and leasing water for instream flows to protect
fish (Scarborough and Lund 2007). Not surprisingly, most of these
payments operate at the local or regional level.
The last service category is landscape amenities. The most
obvious example is ecotourism, where tourism operators pay local landowners or communities to not hunt in certain areas or to
engage in particular land management activities. This approach
has run into the criticism that few meaningful payments from
ecotourism actually end up in the hands of locals. Nonetheless,
as development pressures increase, the value of natural places
will increase, raising the potential for greater revenue flows toward ecotourism.

Designing PAYMENTs FOR
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
Five basic questions must be considered in PES transactions
(see Box 5, page 18). The first concerns what specific service
needs to be provided and whether landscape management can
provide this service. The second question focuses on the providers
and beneficiaries. Unless the sellers and buyers of these services
are discrete, then PES will be very difficult. The third question addresses the level of service that needs to be provided and whether
this can be adequately monitored. If the linkage between landscape management and service provision is poorly understood,
then the buyer will have little confidence he is receiving value for
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services
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Box 5: Key PES Design Questions
1.

What is the service being provided and can landscape management
efficiently provide the service?

2.

Who provides the service and who benefits? Are there discrete groups of
providers and beneficiaries?

3.

What level of service is needed and can this be adequately monitored?

4.

What is the most effective payment mechanism: direct payment,
mitigation and offsets, or certification?

5.

Are the supporting institutions adequate?

his payments. The fourth question asks which type of payment
mechanism is most appropriate. This will depend on a range of
factors, starting with the nature of the service, the scale of service
provision, the buyers, and the sellers. The fifth question asks if
key institutions, such as the law and the courts, are sufficient to
help enforce PES.
18
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What is the Service Being Provided?
In crafting payments to ensure ecosystem service provision,
one first considers which service matters or whether the problem
to be addressed can effectively be handled by land management. If
land management either cannot provide adequate service provision
or cannot do so cost-effectively, then PES may prove ineffective.
This seems easy to determine in the case of local biodiversity,
as it is best provided through conservation of remnant native habitat. If the problem is erosion, the ecosystem service of soil retention
can be supplied through plants’ root systems. If the problem is water
quality, ecosystem services may create a cost-effective source
of provision, as well. Recall that New York City water authorities
determined that water quality could be achieved more cheaply
through land management than through construction of a water
treatment facility (see Box 4, page 14).
Some services are easier to model than others. The relationship between deforestation and erosion or biodiversity conservation, for example, is better understood than its effect on hydrology.
At the outset, therefore, PES designers need to explicitly challenge
their assumptions about service provision. It is hard to think of
a worse outcome for a PES than supporters making unfounded
claims that payments for land management will result in particular
levels of service provision.
Similarly, PES designers need to be clear at the outset about
trade-offs. Land management practices to maximize one type of service may result in reduction of another service. A classic example in
this regard is the relationship between afforestation and water levels.
Plantations of fast-growing trees such as eucalyptus may increase
carbon sequestration, but they can also harm biodiversity, lower
water availability, and reduce streamflows because of evapotranspiration and a lower water table (Jackson et al. 2005). The provision of
some services can also increase others; the maintenance of natural
areas can enhance both biodiversity and pollination services.
Designing Payments For Ecosystem Services
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Who Provides the Service and Who Benefits?
A precondition for market exchange is willing buyers and
sellers. The primary concern of service buyers is a perceived
current or future threat to their service provision. This may seem
obvious, but it is an important point. For example, unless water
consumers recognize a real and impending threat to their supply of clean water (e.g., through increased development of the
forested upper watershed), there is no reason to pay the upper
watershed landowners to keep the forest intact. If the forest were
not threatened by development, PES would seem nonsensical
since the consumers would continue to receive the service of
water provision with or without payments. They can simply continue to act as free riders, enjoying the benefits provided by the
upper watershed owners.
Another precondition for functioning markets is the presence
of discrete providers and beneficiaries. Economists describe this
as a problem of collective action. Unless a relatively small number
of providers and beneficiaries can get together, transaction costs
may become too high for contract formation. The public goods nature of many services makes this a real concern. Biodiversity, for
example, benefits agriculture through service of genetic diversity.
We all gain from these benefits, yet there is no sufficiently discrete
class of beneficiaries with whom landholders can negotiate, and
the transaction costs of gathering enough beneficiaries together
to negotiate for the service may be too high.
Thus it is no surprise that private purchasers of biodiversity’s
benefits are hard to find. For the same reason, one can understand why so many examples of PES are found in the area of
water quality. Most water consumers are not only accustomed to
paying for potable water but can be collectively represented in a
transaction by a single public body such as a water utility or local
government. Put simply, if a land use provides valuable ecosystem
services but they are widely enjoyed by diffuse beneficiaries, it
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is unlikely that a market for services will arise in the absence of
government intervention.

Potential Buyers
Depending on the ecosystem service, there are a wide range
of potential buyers. These are briefly set out below.
Government bodies. When services are public goods or there
are diffuse beneficiaries, it may be necessary for the government
to step in and act on behalf of those benefiting from the services.
The appropriate level of government depends on the scale of
service provision. This might include government payments to
landowners for the services of water quality (local government),
flood control (regional government), or carbon sequestration and
biodiversity conservation (national government).
Corporations. When services are provided to discrete
beneficiaries, private PES buyers may be willing to pay providers
to ensure continuous provision. A hydroelectric company may be
willing to pay upper watershed landowners to keep their forests
intact in order to maintain the service of erosion control (so the lake
behind the dam does not silt up). Corporations may be motivated
by market concerns. Pressure from environmentally conscious
consumers, for example, may cause a company to source its
products or raw materials from supplies that have been certified
as sustainably harvested. They may pay for service provision
because of pressure from shareholders or consumers demanding
improved corporate social responsibility. A company engaged in
land development may voluntarily offset its harm to local biodiversity
by voluntarily restoring habitat elsewhere.
Consumers. A category of consumers may wish to direct
its purchases toward companies and products that act in what
they view as an environmentally responsible manner. Eco-labels
and certification programs can provide information to guide the
purchasing behavior of these “green consumers.” If enough
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consumers wish to buy certified products, then suppliers and
retailers will respond to this market demand. Hunters and anglers
eager for access to land managed for game or to streams maintained
for fishing may be willing to pay for this service as well.
Nonprofits. Conservation groups and land trusts routinely pay
landowners to conserve biodiversity as part of the groups’ central
missions. Similarly, philanthropies may fund service providers to
ensure continued provision of a PES believed to be worthy.

Potential sellers
When the current land use is more profitable than an alternative that provides greater services, a PES approach will be
ineffective unless it can make up for the lost profits. It is at the
margins, comparing the marginal gain or loss from shifting land
uses, that PES operate.
One can usefully divide service providers into two broad
categories. The first is sellers who are paid for changes. That is,
payments are made to landowners willing to change their land
use so that it provides greater services. For example, buyers
interested in biodiversity conservation may pay landowners to
remove invasive species from their property and put in fencing to
keep out predators. Without these payments, land use changes
may not occur.
The second category of sellers is paid for maintaining the
status quo in a manner similar to insurance. It includes those
who currently provide services. Thus, for example, in Costa Rica,
Energia Global, a hydroelectric power company, has been paying
landowners in the upper watershed to keep their lands forested,
described in Box 6, page 23.
In simple terms, Energía Global is concerned with sedimentation of the lake behind their hydroelectric dam. The service of
sediment retention provided through forest conservation prevents
the lake from filling up with silt. Hence the goal of these payments
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Box 6: Energía Global and Erosion Control
Energía Global, a private hydropower company located in the Sarapiqui
watershed of Costa Rica, provides electricity for about 400,000 consumers.
The company wanted to protect the watershed in order to increase the reliability of streamflow throughout the year and to reduce sedimentation. Through
FONAFIFO (a government institution established to bring together ecosystem
service buyers and sellers), Energía Global pays owners of upstream private land
to reforest their land, engage in sustainable forestry, or conserve forest cover.
Landowners who have recently cleared their land or landowners planning to
replace natural forest with plantations are not eligible for compensation. Energía
Global pays US$18 per hectare to FONAFIFO, which then adds an additional
US$30 per hectare. FONAFIFO makes cash payments to landowners who have
signed contracts with Energía Global. Total payments of US$48 per hectare per
year are related to the opportunity costs of reforestation or forest conservation,
such as potential revenues from cattle ranching. A local non-governmental organization oversees the implementation of the conservation activities, carries out
technical studies, and administers the scheme.
Source: Smith et al. (2006).
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is explicitly not to change the land use but, rather, to maintain
current practices. The payments ensure the flow of services will
continue into the future.
The same marginal analysis occurs as described above, except in this case the comparison is between profitability from the
current use versus profitability of future uses that would degrade
service provision. Thus, for example, anglers are beneficiaries of
a wetlands’ role as a nursery for immature fish. If the wetland’s
owner were considering destroying the wetland for a housing development, anglers might be willing to pay owners to maintain the
wetland in its current state. Therefore, the buyers must be willing to
pay at least the marginal profit of what the landowner would have
received by the development (i.e., the lost opportunity cost).
In either case, whether changing current land uses or maintaining them, PES will be most effective when the payments make land
uses marginally more profitable than alternative land use activities.
At the same time, it is important not to focus exclusively on marginal
profits. A number of PES schemes have found that landowners may
be willing to bear some of the costs for service provision themselves
because, for example, they take pride in their property’s biodiversity (Stoneham 2002). As with buyers, there is a range of sellers
of ecosystem services, depending on the service.
Private Landowners. In many countries, most ecosystem
services are provided by private lands. These are often agricultural
lands, including crops, grazing, and silviculture. While one-toone exchanges between buyers and private landowners are
possible, collective action problems are significant. There are high
transaction costs to single negotiations, and gathering together
enough sellers to achieve a significant level of service provision
may be difficult. This is particularly challenging for small-scale
and low-income landowners in many rural areas (particularly in
developing countries) who face an information constraint and may
lack clear legal title to the land.
24

PERC Policy Series

To overcome some of these problems, landowners may organize into a private association to negotiate with a single voice,
better protect their interests, and increase the overall level of
service provision for sale. Such collective organization also allows
sellers to “bundle” different services together (Asquith 2006).
Public landowners. Public bodies control large amounts
of land and may negotiate for service payments. Similarly, a
community group may sell services from communally held land
or from land where community members have specific property
rights such as grazing or cropping.
Mitigation providers. In countries with offset requirements
for development, private parties may create mitigation banks and
sell “credits.” This happens in the United States with wetlands
mitigation and in some states with endangered species habitat.
Certification organizations. It is worth noting that those
who are directly paid may not be the provider of services. In
certification systems, for example, the certifying body is often
paid a licensing fee by the supplier for use of its eco-label. The
certification indicates that the seller is operating in a sustainable
manner (e.g., shade-grown coffee) and this, in turn, signals to
consumers that they should buy this product rather than others
that are lacking the label.

Perverse Incentives
Turning back to the watershed example in Box 1, page 10, recall that farmers graze cows on their fields beside the stream that
flows into the drinking water reservoir. The farmers could manage
their land to provide an improved service of water purification by
planting riparian vegetation buffers. Such vegetative buffers capture
nutrients and reduce silt before they reach the watercourse. Water
consumers downstream benefit from these actions when drinking
clean water that does not require extensive pre-treatment. The PES
creates an incentive for farmers to put in riparian fencing because
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they can now capture the benefits of the water purification services
provided to downstream water drinkers.
If one enquires more closely, though, paying for these services
suggests a number of tensions. To start with, those farmers who
have already put in riparian fencing no longer have a significant potential for increased service provision and, as a result, are unlikely
to be paid. Should every landholder who provides environmental
services be paid? Given a finite budget, the answer to this would
seemingly have to be “no.” It is hard to imagine a practical scheme,
for example, that pays everyone whose vegetation reduces nutrient flow in the watershed. If one seeks to pay for discrete cases
of ecosystem service provision, clearly some land uses are more
important than others. But how should one decide who gets paid
and who does not?
To frame this dilemma more generally, consider which landholders should be supported by ecosystem service payments—
those who currently provide services or those whose properties
pose the greatest nutrient or sediment problems (and hence the
greatest potential for increased service provision)? If we say
people are being paid to provide a service, then how can PES
ignore those who already provide it? Is it not essentially paying
off the bad actors and thereby encouraging undesirable behavior? More generally, how do PES schemes equitably account for
the baseline that is already out there? Those farmers who have
already made the investments and managed their land responsibly may not receive any payments. If only those who have been
less responsible will benefit, the argument goes, this creates a
disincentive to land stewardship. This decision will be a challenge
for many service markets.
Other concerns have been raised over the problems of holdouts and free riders. These are most easily seen in the context
of biodiversity conservation. The functional value of a reserve
design or wildlife corridor depends critically on contiguous par26
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cels. If successful, the benefits from the sum of connected land
parcels managed for biodiversity conservation should be greater
than its parts. This can be frustrated, though, by the actions of
a very small number of landholders who can hold out for prices
well above market rates. Without their participation, it may be
impossible to create effective habitats. Moreover, neighbors of
those who dedicate their lands to biodiversity conservation may
choose not to conserve biodiversity on their own land but, instead,
free ride on the wildlife amenities on adjacent land. Given these
two obstacles to competitive markets, one can understand the
calls for coercive instruments. This is conceptually similar to the
challenge in controversial Supreme Court cases such as Kelo v.
City of New London, where the city imposed eminent domain on
holdouts to urban development. PES can help avoid pressure for
such regulatory controls on property.

What Level of Service Is Needed?
So far this essay has identified the service to be provided,
how it is provided, and who the providers and beneficiaries are,
but what about the level of service provision? At the end of the
day, the two most important aspects of any transaction are what
you are paying for and how much you pay. In a PES program, we
need more precision than simply identifying potential polluters
and service providers. We need to know not only whom to pay,
but also how much to pay them.
It is not enough to know that riparian fencing throughout a
watershed is a good thing because it will improve water quality.
Given the reality of limited resources, the key question becomes
which riparian stretches need to be fenced off to provide the
greatest level of water purification. In other words, given the many
potential service providers, PES programs need to determine
whom to pay and, equally, whom not to pay. This can raise a
number of challenging issues.
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Landscape context matters. For most services, provision is
heterogeneous. Certain properties provide greater service levels
than others because of where they are located. A farm bordering
a river will be more important in providing water purification than
a distant farm. Determining the level of service requires identifying the biophysical pathways of service provision. Consider, for
example, the pilot program to combat salinity along the Macquarie
River in Australia described in Box 7, page 29.
For a PES program to succeed over the long term, the buyers
must be confident that the landscape management they pay for
will, in fact, lead to either improved or continued service provision. This is fundamentally a scientific question, requiring a clear
understanding of the biophysical pathway between landscape
activity, service provision, and service delivery. The success of a
PES scheme depends critically on the accuracy and cost of such
assessments and, by extension, the creation of assessment methodologies for use in the field. This underscores the importance of
modeling and monitoring.
While an obvious assumption in PES schemes, it is worth
emphasizing that the buyers need assurances that the payments
they have made will, in fact, lead to the service provision they desire. To gain this assurance requires both adequate modeling and
monitoring. Effective modeling shows the biophysical pathway of
a service provision, identifying metrics that should be monitored in
order to assess service provision such as a farm’s proximity to a
watercourse. Effective monitoring serves two purposes. First, it creates a baseline. One cannot determine if there has been a change
in service provision unless a baseline exists. This is a fundamental
issue in the “additionality” debate over the role of forests in carbon
markets. Second, monitoring provides the data to assess compliance and service provision once performance has begun.
Monitoring is easier in certain cases than others. PES
schemes based on inputs are easier to monitor than those based
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Box 7: Payments for Evapotranspiration
Underneath much of Australia the groundwater is saline, a remnant of the
sea that used to sit atop the continent. Early settlers were often required to
clear the native vegetation before they could claim title to the land. As a result,
the ecosystem service of evapotranspiration that had served as a water pump
to keep rainwater from reaching the groundwater was seriously weakened.
Large expanses of agricultural areas now face salinity—saline groundwater rising to the root zone of plants and stunting their growth. One area that is feeling
this effect is the Macquarie River valley.
In 1999, New South Wales State Forests signed a contract with Macquarie
River Fruit and Fibre (MRFF), an organization that represents more than 600
Macquarie Valley irrigation farmers, to purchase “salinity control credits.” Rather
than mechanically pumping groundwater to keep the water table below the root
zone of cash crops, MRFF purchased the ecosystem service of evapotranspiration by paying grazers to plant 100 hectares of native forest in the upper Macquarie River catchments, which should lead to a reduction in groundwater levels
in the lower catchments. The project improved relations between the irrigation
farmers (who had been making money) and the sheep farmers (who had not).
This scheme could provide the extra income that would make timber production
a profitable undertaking in traditional grazing areas and provide a steady income
stream during lean crop years.
The challenge in the project has been uncertainty over the link between
upstream revegetation efforts and downstream salinity reduction. The trees
were planted in “salinity hot spots” and estimated to transpire 53.5 megalitres
per hectare over 10 years. It was not known whether this change would lead to
any reduction in salinity downstream or even how much land use change was
needed for significant salinity changes. Given the poor understanding of how the
service is provided and the time lags involved, MRFF chose not to expand the
pilot project until it had more information.

Source: Salzman 2005
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on outputs. If one is mandating or paying for specific land use
practices or changes, such as in the MRFF scheme, compliance
monitoring need only examine the land management change. The
buyer simply visits the piece of land and checks if the fences have
been properly constructed in the right place, for example, or the
correct number of trees has been planted. Once one moves from
services such as carbon sequestration, where relatively simple
relationships can be estimated between ground vegetation and
carbon sequestered, it becomes both more difficult and costly to
measure actual provision from a specific landowner of such services as water purification, pollination, or flood control. Equally, as
the MRFF case study demonstrated, certain services are easier
to model than others. As with other market transactions, PES
works best when the rules are simple and compliance monitoring mechanisms remain inexpensive. Yet this may result in less
information than buyers want. In general, the more accurate the
modeling and monitoring, the better buyers understand whether
land use changes will improve service provision but, equally, the
more expensive the transaction.
The net result is that it will be easier to develop markets for
some services than for others for the simple reason that those
buying services will be more confident that they are receiving
value for their money. How difficult, for example, is linking the
contributions of individual land management decisions to water
quality in a water supplier’s subcatchment? The success of an
ecosystem services approach for water quality depends on the
accuracy and cost of such assessments and, by extension, the
creation of assessment methodologies for use in the field.

What Is the Most Effective Payment Plan?
While it has become commonplace to speak of “PES markets,” in fact, few true markets for PES exist. With the exception
of carbon credits, it is rarely the case that multiple buyers and
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sellers exchange the same good on an open market. Rather, as
described above, most PES schemes consist of a single buyer
purchasing service provision from one or multiple sellers.
While one can divide the types of PES mechanisms into
many different categories, at a broad level there are three basic
types—direct payment (general subsidy, scored subsidy, reverse
auction, and negotiation), mitigation and offset payments (clean
development mechanism, wetlands mitigation banking, and
biodiversity offsets), and certification (eco-labels and forestry
certification). Which mechanism is most appropriate will depend
on a number of factors, including the type of service, the legal
setting, whether the parties are public or private, the difficulty
and cost of obtaining information, the availability of funds, the
supporting institutions, etc.

Direct Payment
The simplest form of payment is a direct subsidy. Thus, for
example, a government program concerned with soil erosion may
provide funds for farmers to plant crops or till their lands in a manner
that reduces erosion. This may be on a “first come-first served” basis,
with the first applicants receiving funds until the money runs out. The
major benefit of this approach is low information requirements and
administrative costs. It may also allow for a period of experimentation
to see what sorts of land management changes provide the most
benefit. It may also satisfy political pressure to provide a subsidy to
a particular land-owning interest group. General subsidies, however,
may prove inefficient for they cannot meaningfully distinguish between those parties who can provide high-value services and those
who may provide low-value services. So long as the land is located
in a qualifying area and the owner commits to a particular land use
practice, he or she is eligible for a payment.
Another common approach involves direct negotiation with
providers by either public or private parties. This approach starts
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with the assumption that different landholders can provide different levels of service and should be compensated accordingly. The
service beneficiary sits down with the service provider and strikes
a deal. While the transaction costs can be higher than with other
mechanisms, it may be preferable when there are few market participants or there are significant uncertainties over service provision
or willingness to accept.
Direct negotiation has the advantage of allowing individually
crafted agreements but can be labor intensive if carried out with
a large number of landholders. It also lacks the mechanism of
farmers competing against one another to provide services and
requires the purchaser to assess accurately the landholder’s
willingness to accept.

Mitigation and Offset Payments
Mitigation and offset markets are based on regulations that
prohibit certain behaviors. For this reason, they are sometimes
called “compliance markets.” Regulations also create an exemption to its prohibition if the party can offset or mitigate its harm
elsewhere. If a developer builds a road that destroys wetlands,
for example, it must either create wetlands elsewhere to offset or
mitigate its harms or, as is more often the case, purchase “credits” from a third party who has already created wetlands for this
purpose. The government plays a central role in setting the rules
for these trades—what types of wetlands qualify, how many more
acres of wetlands must be created than those destroyed, and
how one measures the trade (hectares, wetlands function, etc.).
Wetlands regulations in the United States, for example, are based
on the premise of “no net loss.” If a hectare of wetlands is filled
for development, then this harm must be mitigated by the creation
of a hectare or more of wetlands somewhere else. Only when
the mitigation requirements have been satisfied may a permit for
wetlands development be issued.
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A similar, though smaller, market exists for biodiversity offsets. In
exchange for permission to develop in a species habitat, the developer must mitigate the harm by restoring species habitat elsewhere.
As described below, some mitigation markets are voluntary, with
companies choosing to restore habitat on their own. The challenge
for such markets lies in comparability. Unlike a molecule of carbon
dioxide, which is the same no matter where emitted or sequestered
in the world, biodiversity is both heterogeneous and location specific,
making trades difficult.
Offset markets operate in a similar manner with pollutants. In
the context of climate change, some regulatory markets permit those
emitting greenhouse gases to offset their emissions by purchasing
credits for sequestered carbon. Because planting trees can remove
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, the market designers assume
that a ton of sequestered carbon dioxide is equivalent to a ton of
reduced carbon dioxide emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, for example,
created the Clean Development Mechanism. This provides for reduction credits from carbon sequestered by land management. Negotiations are currently underway for the next climate treaty, and many
believe that a similar offset provision, known as REDD (Reduced
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), will be included in the final draft. In simple terms, REDD would pay countries
for reducing emissions that would have occurred if deforestation
had continued at its historic rates. REDD provides payments for
improving the ecosystem service of carbon sequestration. Voluntary
markets—carbon trades that operate outside the Kyoto framework
and national laws—have also been on the rise, primarily driven by
corporate social responsibility concerns (Hamilton et al. 2010).
Constructing smoothly functioning offset and mitigation markets is not simple. There must be a sufficient and well-defined
marketplace as well as a community of market participants. There
also must be a refined currency of trade, one that is fungible and
reflects the desired environmental quality. For example, it would
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be a stretch to consider allowing coastal developers in one state to
“trade” wetland values they eliminate for reductions in phosphorous
emissions in another state.

Certification
Growing in importance since the 1990s, certification schemes
focus on the importance of consumption in degrading ecosystem
services. As previously noted, a lack of information is a significant
barrier to environmental protection. Consumers and corporations
wishing to promote environmentally responsible practices through
their purchasing behavior cannot do so unless they have information
on the attributes of the products they wish to buy or the behavior
of their suppliers. Certification and eco-labels attempt to provide
this information. The premise of these programs is that a significant
percentage of consumers and companies will prefer to purchase
goods and services that are environmentally preferable if there is a
reliable means of identifying them. This, in turn, will provide these
goods and services a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
To address this information need, eco-labels and certification
schemes have grown rapidly over the past two decades across
a range of sectors, including sustainably harvested timber, coffee, fisheries, agriculture, and even financial companies and
eco-tourism. These certification initiatives’ goal is to provide
consumers with an objective basis for selecting environmentally
responsible products (see Box 8, page 35).

Are the Supporting Institutions Adequate?
Very few transactions take place in the absence of supporting
institutions. Even the simplest contracts between buyers and sellers
rely on institutions (formal or informal) to adjudicate disputes when
they arise and on enforcement to ensure the judgments are carried
out. A range of specialized institutions, both public and private, can
promote PES transactions. Consider, for example, the role of institu34
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Box 8: Forest Stewardship Certification
Founded in 1993, the Forest Stewardship Certification (FSC) has created
a mechanism to set standards, certify, and label forest products that have been
managed in an environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable manner.
FSC certification is voluntary. Forest owners who wish to use the FSC label in
marketing their products must satisfy the relevant FSC standards developed for
particular types of forests and conditions. Common principles include compliance with laws, clear tenure and use rights, recognition and respect for indigenous rights to the forest, etc. Compliance is certified by an FSC-accredited body
that audits and then approves individual forest management.
Because timber is a global market, chain of custody becomes important. It
is necessary to ensure that FSC-certified timber can be tracked throughout the
supply chain from harvest to point of sale. This is accomplished through Chain
of Custody certification, a system that ensures controls are in place to track
certified wood products throughout the supply chain. Importantly, FSC does
not itself conduct any certification activities of forest management or the supply
chain. These are conducted by accredited certification organizations (currently
twelve around the globe). The forest product producers are responsible for the
certification costs.
As of December 2008, roughly 107 million hectares of forest in 78 countries
were FSC-certified. Approximately 12,000 FSC Chain of Custody certificates
have been issued in 81 countries.
Source: Forest Stewardship Council (2009).
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tions in the case of payments for carbon sequestration. To facilitate
exchange of carbon sequestration credits, the Australian state of
New South Wales has statutorily created an alienable property right
in sequestered carbon. Thus, a forest landowner can sell credits for
carbon stored in his or her trees, and this can then be sold again by
third parties. Carbon registries have been created, as well, to record
obligations and credits. In the United States, the Chicago Climate
Exchange provides a marketplace for buyers and sellers of carbon
credits to exchange with one another. A number of countries have
created the equivalent of a national carbon office that keeps track
of carbon emissions and reduction projects, and private certification organizations now provide the service of certifying that carbon
sequestration projects accurately report on their activities.
There are many different types of institutions that can support PES and, importantly, these need not be formal government
bodies. Indeed, in many parts of the world formal institutions are
ineffective, and parties cannot assume that laws will be complied
with or enforced. In such cases, informal local institutions, based
on customary practices, can provide the support needed for PES
schemes to operate.
Because payment is generally premised on specific land use
activities, a basic obligation of the provider is to demonstrate sufficient ownership or control of the land to ensure service provision.
The buyers need to know whom to pay and have some assurance
that the seller can undertake the land management or service
provision to which they have agreed. In broad terms, this is an
issue of property rights. Unless property rights are well defined
and protected, people have limited ability and incentive to care
for property over time. Compared to most countries, the United
States has strong institutions that provide relatively secure legal
rights to property owners. It is a common value for people to want
to leave the land for the next generation in better condition than
when received. As wealth has increased, property values have
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risen, which, in turn, may now increase efforts to restore land and
waterways to quality conditions.
There are many different types of property rights. These include
the right to occupy, the right to use, the right to derive income, the right
to sell, and the right to exclude, among others. Obviously, depending
on the circumstances, some of these rights will be more important for
service provision than others. In an ideal situation, the provider would
hold all of these property rights and could easily prove ownership of
the land. This is often the case in developed countries. In much of
the world, however, this can prove a major challenge.
Supporting institutions are particularly important in the context
of property rights. In a developed system, owners need a land
registry where they can record their title and where buyers can
search titles. There also must be adequate contract law and legal
institutions to adjudicate disputes as well as adequate authorities
to enforce judgments. These supporting institutions, however,
are not always present, particularly in parts of some developing
countries. This does not, however, mean that PES schemes cannot
successfully operate there.
Because clear title is not always available and the cost of establishing clear title may not be justified by the size of the service
payments, PES must often consider both de jure and de facto legal
title. De jure title describes the legally recognized ownership status;
de facto describes the actual practice on the ground. Individuals
or communities may effectively control land so that service provision can be ensured even though they may not have clear legal
title. Those on the land may even be squatters. In such a case,
de facto status may be more important than de jure status. This is
particularly significant when supporting institutions such as government monitoring and enforcement are weak. Indeed, in some
cases service payments are particularly attractive because they
are seen as a way to legitimize unclear land title by giving the land
manager greater credibility (Greiber 2009).
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CONCLUSION
Payments for ecosystem services represent a promising
development not only in terms of conservation mechanisms but,
more generally, in how we think about conservation. By identifying the critical role that landscape management plays in providing
valued services, PES frames environmental protection explicitly as
a matter of private ordering between suppliers and beneficiaries.
In some cases, this can provide an attractive and more effective alternative to traditional regulations. This arrangement also
encourages landowners to view their property in a different way.
PES can identify new streams of income that may not have been
recognized or optimized before, creating incentives for landowners
to manage their properties specifically for the provision of clean
water, biodiversity, or other amenities.
This arrangement, of course, is not a silver bullet. This Policy
Series has identified the necessary preconditions for successful
PES. Absent perceived scarcity of the service, discrete buyers and
sellers, secure property rights, and other conditions, it is unlikely
that PES will emerge. That being said, PES represents a promising
development of voluntary exchanges through markets that enhance
environmental asset development. As we learn more about the
values of the complex resources provided by an ecosystem, we
become more willing to invest in husbanding those resources.

Note
1.		

PES refers to voluntary transactions where a service provider is paid
by or on behalf of service beneficiaries for land, coastal, or marine
management practices that are expected to result in continued or
improved service provision. Sven Wunder (2005) defines PES as
having five attributes: (1) a voluntary transaction where (2) a welldefined ES—or a land-use likely to secure that service (3) is being
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“bought” by an ES buyer (4) from an ES provider (5) if, and only if,
the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality).
The shortcoming of this definition is that only a small percentage
of PES schemes satisfy condition five. Most PES are based on
inputs (i.e., land management practices) rather than outputs (i.e., a
measurable change in service provision), whether this increases the
service provision or not.
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